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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




This matter comes before this court on an appeal by the 
government from a judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered in the district court on August 26, 1999, against 
the defendant Deneen Sweeting ("Sweeting"). This appeal 
presents the sole question of whether the district court 
abused its discretion in awarding Sweeting a 12-level 
downward departure from the sentencing range applicable 
under the United States Sentencing Guidelines ("the 
Guidelines" or "U.S.S.G.") for extraordinary family ties and 
responsibilities pursuant to U.S.S.G. S 5H1.6, p.s. 
(hereinafter cited in the text as "section 5H1.6"). After a 
careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case, 
we are constrained to agree with the government's position 
that Sweeting's family ties and responsibilities were not 
"extraordinary" in any degree to warrant a departure under 
section 5H1.6, and that the district court thus abused its 
discretion in departing downward on this basis. 
Accordingly, we will vacate the sentence and remand the 
case to the district court for sentencing in accordance with 
this opinion. 
 
II. FACTS and PROCEEDINGS 
 
On August 11, 1998, a federal grand jury returned a six- 
count indictment charging Sweeting with violations of the 
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Controlled Substances Act. On October 29, 1998, Sweeting 
pleaded guilty to count V of the indictment, distribution 
and possession with an intent to distribute cocaine, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 841(a)(1). 
 
The United States Probation Office prepared Sweeting's 
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSI"). The PSI calculated 
that Sweeting was responsible for the distribution of at 
least 300 grams but less than 400 grams of cocaine. Given 
Sweeting's offense conduct and prior criminal history, the 
PSI calculated a total offense level of 19 and a criminal 
history category of VI, which placed her in the sentencing 
range of 63-78 months imprisonment under the Guidelines. 
 
Sweeting did not object to the content of the PSI or its 
calculation of the final offense level and criminal history 
category. She nevertheless filed a motion seeking a 
downward departure from the Guidelines range 
recommended in the PSI, offering the following grounds for 
the departure request: (1) the Category VI criminal history 
overstated the seriousness of her prior conduct; (2) she 
engaged in extraordinary post-offense rehabilitation efforts; 
and (3) there were extraordinary family ties and 
responsibilities in this case because she was solely 
responsible for the care and support of her five children, 
one of whom had been diagnosed with Tourette's 
Syndrome. The government opposed the motion, arguing, 
inter alia, that Sweeting's family responsibilities did not 
warrant any departure from the Guidelines range 
recommended in the PSI. 
 
As reflected in the PSI, Sweeting is a single mother of five 
children who were of ages five through 14 at the time of her 
sentencing in the district court. In September of 1997, Dr. 
Kenneth W. Lilik, M.D. ("Dr. Lilik"), a neurologist, 
diagnosed Sweeting's oldest son as afflicted with Tourette's 
Syndrome, a neurological disorder characterized by facial 
and body tics, often accompanied by grunts and compulsive 
utterances. PSI P 46. Dr. Lilik reported that Sweeting's son 
suffered from several symptoms of Tourette's Syndrome, 
including involuntary throat clearing, head nodding, and 
bringing his fist in contact with his mouth. His report noted 
that the child displayed head nodding movements during 
the course of his examination, "particularly as he became 
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more tense." App. at 65. The examination concluded with 
several treatment suggestions, including daily physical 
activity, and organization of the young man's personal 
habits, school work and home responsibilities. Dr. Lilik also 
provided Sweeting with a list of foods to eliminate from her 
son's diet, and indicated that her son should avoid taking 
stimulant decongestive medications and refrain from 
watching television and video games during the school 
week. Id. 
 
Dr. Lilik reevaluated Sweeting's son in December 1998. 
Dr. Lilik noted that he "had transient resolution of his ticks 
and gulping while he played football," but that his 
symptoms had returned because he was no longer involved 
in sports activities. His report concluded by suggesting that 
Sweeting's son should participate in a daily exercise 
program (in the mornings) and become involved in sports 
throughout the entire year. He indicated that "[i]f 
nonmedication strategies are inadequate, we may consider 
the use of Pamelor or Zoloft, if he feels that social 
difficulties remain due to his tics." Dr. Lilik ordered a follow 
up visit in one year. App. at 64. Sweeting certified that as 
of May 19, 1999, her son was taking Pamelor to assist in 
controlling the physical symptoms of Tourette's Syndrome. 
 
The district court held a sentencing hearing on August 
25, 1999. During the colloquy between the court and 
counsel relating to Sweeting's extraordinary family 
circumstances, defense counsel described the nature of her 
son's disorder and Sweeting's responsibilities in caring for 
her son as follows: 
 
       [I]n this particular instance, this is not a handicap that 
       [the child] suffers from which is so disabling that he 
       can't play football, he plays football. Or he can't attend 
       school, he does attend school. But his handicap is 
       permanent, it is neurological, it's medically diagnosed 
       by a pediatric neurosurgeon, and has been introduced 
       into the record. Its practical effect, its manifestation on 
       this young man in school was testified to by Karen 
       DeSantis, who said that it causes him a learning 
       disability. Some of the manifestations are twitching of 
       his eyes, that is, he blinks both of his eyes and it 
       causes him to cock his head back without--in an 
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       involuntary manner repeatedly, such that he has had 
       neck sprains while being in school. They flare-up more 
       intensely during times of anxiety and tensions. For 
       instance, in school when he's having tests. 
 
        His mother gets up with him at the crack of dawn, 
       does physical exercises with him. This is not--she 
       doesn't have to be an RN or a physical therapist, but 
       this is what she does. She gets him up and goes 
       through physical training with him, which is 
       recommended by [the neurologist]. She closely 
       monitors and regulates the types of foods that he 
       ingests, by and large he has to steer away from sweets 
       and she guards against that. She makes him lunches, 
       she makes him breakfast, she makes him dinner, all 
       the while juggling four other kids and work. 
 
        When he comes home at night she has to spend 
       more time with him going through his homework at 
       night. She has a routine with him. And during the 
       more intense times of schooling she does have to 
       regulate and make sure that he takes medication at 
       night to beat back the Tourette's Syndrome. . . . 
 
        That is something that is distinct, unique and 
       requires constant attention. It will only get worse if 
       that is not clearly closely monitored, and it is with him 
       for the rest of his life. All of that is documented and 
       supported by the record in this case. 
 
App. at 179-81. Sweeting certified that Dr. Lilik informed 
her that "without this routine the prognosis is that the 
symptoms will become more aggravated to the point that he 
would involuntarily make animal noises, or develop into a 
serious case of Attention Deficit Disorder." App. at 103. 
 
After hearing testimony and argument from counsel, the 
court ruled on Sweeting's motion for a downward 
departure. First, it determined that the PSI overstated 
Sweeting's criminal history, which it thus reduced from 
Category VI to Category IV. Second, the court found that 
Sweeting's extraordinary rehabilitative efforts warranted a 
1-level decrease in offense level. This departure reduced the 
offense level to 18 which, combined with a criminal history 
Category IV, produced a Guidelines range of 41-51 months 
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imprisonment. App. at 200. The government does not 
challenge these downward departures. 
 
The district court, however, made a third departure 
which forms the basis for the government's appeal in this 
case. Specifically, the court determined that section 5H1.6 
provided a court with the discretion to depart from the 
Guidelines where the circumstances demonstrated that the 
defendant's family ties and responsibilities were 
"extraordinary." From that initial premise, the court found 
that this case presented extraordinary circumstances 
because "Ms. Sweeting is a single parent providing for five 
children, one of whom has a substantial neurological deficit 
in the form of Tourette's Syndrome." App. at 202. The court 
then departed downward 12 levels, producing an adjusted 
offense level of 6, which, combined with a criminal history 
Category IV, produced a Guidelines range of 6-12 months 
imprisonment. App. at 203-04. Consistent with that 
Guidelines range, the district court imposed a sentence of 
five years probation, 12 months home detention with 
electronic monitoring, 200 hours of community service, and 
a special assessment of $100. App. at 13. The district court 
entered the final judgment of conviction and sentence on 
August 26, 1999. 
 
The government filed a timely notice of appeal on 
September 23, 1999. Its sole challenge on appeal relates to 
the district court's 12-level departure for extraordinary 




In the usual case, the district court is required to impose 
a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range. See 18 
U.S.C. S 3553(b). "For the most part, a court can treat each 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. The district court exercised subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. S 3231, which provides that the district courts have original 
jurisdiction "of all offenses against the laws of the United States." We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction over the district court's final order 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291, and have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. 
S 3742(b)(3) to review a final sentence where, as here, the sentence is 
less than the minimum sentence specified in the applicable Guidelines 
range. 
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guideline as carving out a `heartland,' a set of typical cases 
embodying the conduct that each guideline describes." 
United States v. Baird, 109 F.3d 856, 870 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(citing and quoting 1994 U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A., intro. 
comment. 4(b)) (internal quotation marks omitted). But in 
the unusual case in which a defendant's conduct falls 
outside the typical "heartland" of cases, the district court 
may consider whether a departure is appropriate. See 
United States v. Iannone, 184 F.3d 214, 226 (3d Cir. 1999). 
Section 5K2.0 of the Guidelines provides that a court may 
impose a sentence outside the applicable Guidelines range 
"if the court finds `that there exists an aggravating or 
mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing 
Commission in formulating the guidelines that should 
result in a sentence different than that described.' " See 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0, p.s. (quoting 18 U.S.C.S 3553(b)). That 
section further states that "an offender characteristic or 
other circumstance that is, in the Commission's view, `not 
ordinarily relevant' in determining whether a sentence 
should be outside the applicable guideline range may be 
relevant to this determination if such characteristic or 
circumstance is present to an unusual degree and 
distinguishes the case from the `heartland' of cases covered 
by the guidelines. . . ." Id. 
 
One of the offender characteristics that the Sentencing 
Commission specifically has identified as "not ordinarily 
relevant" in determining an offender's sentence is the 
defendant's family ties and responsibilities. Section 5H1.6 
of the Guidelines provides that "[f]amily ties and 
responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining whether a sentence should be outside the 
applicable guideline range."2 Thus, the Sentencing 
Commission has classified the existence of family ties and 
responsibilities as a "discouraged" basis for departure. See 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95, 116 S.Ct. 2035, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The genesis of section 5H1.6 lies in Congress' directive to the 
Sentencing Commission to "assure that the guidelines and policy 
statements . . . reflect the general inappropriateness of considering the 
. . . family ties and responsibilities . . . of the defendant." 28 U.S.C. 
S 994(e). 
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2045 (1996) (explaining that the district court's departure 
analysis must involve a determination whether the 
Guidelines forbid departures based on the factor, encourage 
departures on that basis, discourage departures, or do not 
mention the factor at all). "The Commission does not view 
discouraged factors `as necessarily inappropriate' bases for 
departure but says they should be relied upon only`in 
exceptional cases.' " See id. (quoting 1995 U.S.S.G. ch. 5, 
pt. H, intro. comment.). Indeed, the commentary to 
U.S.S.G. S 5K2.0 explains that with respect to a departure 
decision predicated on a discouraged offender characteristic 
or other circumstance "not ordinarily relevant" to 
sentencing determinations, "[i]n the absence of a 
characteristic or circumstance that distinguishes a case as 
sufficiently atypical to warrant a sentence different from 
that called for under the guidelines, a sentence outside the 
guideline range is not authorized." U.S.S.G.S 5K2.0 
comment. 
 
At the risk of stating the obvious, then, a downward 
departure based on family ties and responsibilities should 
be the exception rather than the rule. See United States v. 
Higgins, 967 F.2d 841, 846 (3d Cir. 1992) (remanding to 
district court to determine, inter alia, if defendant's family 
ties and responsibilities fell within the "very narrow 
category" of "extraordinary"); see also United States v. 
Tocco, 200 F.3d 401, 436 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The district court 
has broad discretion in dealing with requests for departure 
. . . but the Sentencing Commission and the courts expect 
that they will not often occur. . . ."); United States v. 
Archuleta, 128 F.3d 1446, 1450 (10th Cir. 1997) ("The 
question before us, then, is whether the record in this case 
establishes family circumstances so exceptional that they 
constitute the rare case justifying a departure from the 
guidelines which already recognize the reality of difficult 
family circumstances for many defendants and which 
discourage making an additional allowance on that basis."); 
United States v. Dyce, 91 F.3d 1462, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 
("[W]e underscore what is implicit in the word 
`extraordinary' and explicit in the Guidelines themselves: 
departures on [the basis of family ties and responsibilities] 
should be rare."). This observation, in turn, must inform 
our analysis as to the type of family situation which 
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legitimately may be categorized as "extraordinary" and thus 
outside the typical heartland of cases the Guidelines were 
designed to cover. See Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1466 (noting that 
a court may depart on the basis of family ties and 
responsibilities only if the case "significantly differs from 
the norm") (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
We review a district court's decision to depart from the 
applicable Guidelines range under an abuse of discretion 
standard, giving due deference to the district court's 
institutional advantage over an appellate court in 
comparing one sentencing case to another. See Koon, 518 
U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. at 2046-47 ("Before a departure is 
permitted, certain aspects of the case must be found 
unusual enough for it to fall outside the heartland of cases 
in the Guideline. To resolve this question, the district court 
must make a refined assessment of the many facts bearing 
on the outcome, informed by its vantage point and day-to- 
day experience in criminal sentencing."); see also Iannone, 
184 F.3d at 227 ("[W]e note the substantial deference that 
we owe the decision to depart from the Guidelines."). 
Nevertheless, we agree with the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit's observation that an appellate court's 
review of a departure determination in this context must 
" `ensure that the circumstances relied upon to justify a 
downward departure are [not] so far removed from those 
found exceptional in existing case law that the sentencing 
court may be said to be acting outside permissible limits.' " 
See United States v. Faria, 161 F.3d 761, 762 (2d Cir. 1998) 
(quoting United States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 534-35 (2d 
Cir. 1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration in 
original); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. at 2047 
("Whether a given factor is present to a degree not 
adequately considered by the Commission, or whether a 
discouraged factor nonetheless justifies departure because 
it is present in some unusual or exceptional way, are 
matters determined in large part by comparison with the 
facts of other Guidelines cases."). 
 
The issue implicated in this case, simply stated, is 
whether Sweeting's family circumstances constitute 
"extraordinary" family ties and responsibilities. As the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit 
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recognized in Dyce, "[t]he issue is admittedly a murky one." 
See 91 F.3d at 1466. Indeed, while 
 
       [i]t may not be unusual, for example, to find that a 
       convicted drug offender is a single mother with family 
       responsibilities, . . . at some point, the nature and 
       magnitude of family responsibilities (many children? 
       with handicaps? no money? no place for children to 
       go?) may transform the `ordinary' case of such 
       circumstances into a case that is not at all ordinary. 
 
See United States v. Rivera, 994 F.2d 942, 948 (1st Cir. 
1993); see also Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1466 (quoting Rivera, 994 
F.2d at 948). 
 
To reiterate, the district court predicated its ruling on the 
fact that Sweeting "is a single parent providing for five 
children, one of whom has a substantial neurological deficit 
in the form of Tourette's Syndrome." App. at 202. The 
district court expounded on that point as follows: 
 
       It is a breakdown in the family, a breakdown that is all 
       too common. And we collectively, as a society, should 
       do what we can to support the family and to sometimes 
       take--you can call it a risk or make an investment in 
       a decision that supports the family. And I have decided 
       in this case that I will make that investment collectively 
       on behalf of society that invests in me the discretionary 
       authority to depart downward based upon 
       extraordinary circumstances. I find that the 
       extraordinary circumstance in this case is that Ms. 
       Sweeting is a single parent providing for five children, 
       one of whom has a substantial neurological deficit in 
       the form of Tourette's syndrome. That from all of the 
       evidence that has been presented to me, Ms. Sweeting 
       is a substantial positive influence on the children's 
       lives. That incarceration would have a very serious 
       detrimental effect on the family unit, that it would 
       break up the family unit, and that's a consequence 
       that I don't want to see happen in this case. 
 
        It's a consequence that I think we as a society 
       should, when we have the ability, try to avoid. It's not 
       a decision I make that is lightly taken, and it is also a 
       decision I know that's in some respects risky, maybe 
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       you call it a high risk investment in light of Ms. 
       Sweeting's prior record. 
 
App. at 202-03. 
 
The government contests the district court's ruling on 
several grounds. First, it maintains that the court erred in 
relying upon the fact that Sweeting is the sole provider for 
her five children because we determined in United States v. 
Headley, 923 F.2d 1079 (3d Cir. 1991), that a defendant's 
status as a single mother of five children was not 
"extraordinary" in the sense that it was so atypical of the 
situations facing most convicted felons that it fell outside 
the heartland of cases sentenced under the Guidelines. 
Next, it points out that under our case law, the fact that 
Sweeting is a substantial positive influence on her 
children's lives and that her incarceration would break up 
the family unit similarly does not take this case out of the 
heartland and render her situation extraordinary. Itfinally 
contends that the fact that Sweeting's oldest child suffers 
from Tourette's Syndrome is insufficient under the 
circumstances of this case to support the district court's 
ultimate factual finding that her family responsibilities were 
extraordinary. It points out in this connection that there is 
nothing extraordinarily atypical about Sweeting's 
responsibilities to her oldest son, or the needs of the child 
himself, that indicate that her presence at home is essential 
to his care and well-being. 
 
We agree entirely with the government's assessment of 
the circumstances of this case. Put simply, we find that 
none of the factors the district court considered, taken 
individually or in their entirety, present extraordinary 
family ties and responsibilities taking this case out of the 
heartland of cases sentenced under the Guidelines. 3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We point out that the government does not challenge the accuracy of 
the evidence in the record concerning the nature of Sweeting's family ties 
and responsibilities--for example--the type of specialized care her son 
requires because of his condition. Rather, it asserts that the facts in 
the 
record do not warrant a downward departure because they do not 
demonstrate that her family situation is extraordinary in the sense 
contemplated by section 5H1.6. Similarly, for purposes of our analysis, 
we assume the accuracy of the historical facts in the record, but part 
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Consequently, we find that Sweeting's family ties and 
responsibilities present an insufficient basis for a departure 
pursuant to section 5H1.6. 
 
First, as our cases repeatedly have recognized, the 
circumstance that Sweeting's incarceration will disrupt the 
family unit cannot be considered atypical, inasmuch as 
innumerable defendants no doubt could establish that their 
absence will cause a void in their children's lives. As a 
practical matter, it may be said that most children look to 
their parents for support, guidance and stability. But, as 
we indicated in United States v. Gaskill, 991 F.2d 82 (3d 
Cir. 1993), "[d]isruptions of the defendant's life, and the 
concomitant difficulties for those who depend on the 
defendant, are inherent in the punishment of incarceration. 
Disintegration of family life in most cases is not enough to 
warrant departures." Id. at 85 (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Reilly, 
33 F.3d 1396, 1424 n.22 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Gaskill, 
991 F.2d at 84); accord Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1468 (as 
"innumerable defendants could no doubt establish[,] . . . a 
prison sentence[ ] normally disrupts . . . parental 
relationships") (internal quotation marks omitted); United 
States v. Brown, 29 F.3d 953, 961 (5th Cir. 1994) (same). 
 
We also point out that while Sweeting appears devoted to 
her children and is "a substantial positive influence" on 
their lives, see app. at 203, the district court's reliance on 
those facts was inappropriate because they do not take this 
case out of the "heartland" of cases sentenced under the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
company with the district court's ultimate factual conclusion that those 
circumstances render Sweeting's family ties and responsibilities so 
"extraordinary" so as to take this case out of the heartland of cases 
sentenced under the Guidelines. 
 
Moreover, it is appropriate to mention at this juncture that although 
our analysis of the nature of Sweeting's family responsibilities proceeds 
by examining each component of the district court's analysis separately, 
we have considered the cumulative effect of the totality of the 
circumstances presented in this case. And, as we have indicated in the 
text, we simply see no sound basis for upholding the district court's 
departure determination notwithstanding our deferential standard of 
review. 
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Guidelines involving a defendant who also is a parent. 
Indeed, in United States v. Shoupe, 929 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 
1991), we expressly rejected the defendant's argument that 
a departure under section 5H1.6 was warranted because he 
was a good father to his son. There the defendant's 
presentence report revealed that he had a young son who 
resided with his former wife, that the defendant paid 
regular child support, frequently spoke with the child by 
telephone and visited him. Defendant's counsel stated at 
the sentencing hearing that his client was "a good father." 
See id. at 121. We held that "[t]hese facts do not show such 
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities as to justify a 
departure despite Section 5H1.6." Id.; see also United 
States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1997) 
(reversing downward departure based on district court's 
finding that defendant's attention to his children was 
extraordinary based on the defendant's lack of parental 
guidance as a child); United States v. Webb, 49 F.3d 636, 
638 (10th Cir. 1995) (reversing district court's downward 
departure where circumstances showed only that defendant 
was sole caretaker of his son, had positive influence on his 
life, and that son needed "to be taken care of "); United 
States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding 
that district court erred in awarding downward departure 
for extraordinary circumstances; court of appeals found 
that the factors the district court relied on, specifically the 
fact that the defendant's children would be separated and 
placed with "blood strangers," simply were not 
extraordinary). 
 
The district court also relied in its departure ruling on 
the related circumstance that Sweeting was a single mother 
and the sole provider for her five children. But in doing so, 
the government is correct that the court appears to have 
overlooked our opinion in United States v. Headley, 923 
F.2d 1079. Headley was a single mother of five children, 
ranging in age from 11 months to 11 years who was 
convicted of charges stemming from her activities as a drug 
courier for a large narcotics manufacturing and distribution 
organization. She had a relationship with the leader of the 
drug organization in which she participated, and it was 
undisputed that he was the father of her five children. 
Headley argued in the district court for a downward 
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departure for extraordinary family responsibilities under 
section 5H1.6, but the court held that it lacked authority to 
depart downward from the applicable Guidelines range on 
that basis. The district court thus sentenced Headley to 17 
years imprisonment, the minimum in her Guidelines range. 
See id. at 1081-82. 
 
Headley appealed, arguing that the district court erred in 
concluding that it lacked authority to consider the 
psychological impact that a lengthy sentence would have on 
her five young children. We rejected her argument, 
explaining that as of that time, "every court to consider the 
issue of departure based on the effect that sentencing a 
single parent to prison will have on minor children has 
found the circumstances not to be extraordinary." See id. at 
1082. But see United States v. Johnson, 964 F.2d 124, 129 
(2d Cir. 1992) (deciding after Headley that section 5H1.6 
departure was warranted because the defendant, who"was 
solely responsible for the upbringing of her three young 
children, including an infant, and of the young child of her 
institutionalized [adult] daughter, . . . faced extraordinary 
parental responsibilities"). 
 
We obviously predicated our ruling in Headley  on the 
unfortunate reality that single parents often commit crimes 
requiring incarceration. As the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit explained in United States v. Brand: 
 
       A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today's 
       society, and imprisoning such a parent will by 
       definition separate the parent from the children. It is 
       apparent that in many cases, the other parent may be 
       unwilling or unable to care for the children, and that 
       the children will have to live with friends, relatives or 
       even in foster homes. . . . [Defendant's] situation, 
       though unfortunate, is simply not out of the ordinary. 
 
907 F.2d at 33; see also United States v. Leandre, 132 F.3d 
796, 807-08 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (affirming district court's 
denial of the defendant's request for downward departure 
under section 5H1.6 based on fact that he was a single 
father of two young children who might be placed in foster 
care as a result of incarceration; court of appeals stated 
that "[f]rom the perspective of the defendant's children, the 
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result may be harsh but it is not so extraordinary a 
circumstance confronting sentencing judges"). Thus, 
despite the fact that Headley's situation was unfortunate, 
we held that incarceration of a single parent and its 
concomitant effects on the children simply cannot be 
characterized as out of the ordinary. Accord Archuleta, 128 
F.3d at 1450; Leandre, 132 F.3d at 807-08; United States 
v. Rodriguez-Valarde, 127 F.3d 966, 969 (10th Cir. 1997) 
(collecting cases); Webb, 49 F.3d at 638-39; United States v. 
Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992); Brand, 907 
F.2d at 33. We therefore agree with the government's 
position that the district court's ruling, to the extent that 
the court predicated it on Sweeting's status as a single 
mother, was inconsistent with our decision in Headley. 
 
As the foregoing demonstrates, the fact that Sweeting is 
a devoted single mother of five whose children solely 
depend on her for support and guidance simply does not 
meet the threshold of "extraordinary" when compared to the 
innumerable cases in which parents commit crimes and are 
sentenced under the Guidelines. Thus, we must consider at 
this point the only factor that arguably removes this case 
from the heartland of cases under the Guidelines, and 
distinguishes this case from the situation we faced in 
Headley--namely, that Sweeting's oldest son suffers from 
Tourette's Syndrome.4 Sweeting argues that it is clear that 
responsibility for the care of a sick family member may 
constitute an extraordinary circumstance warranting a 
departure. See br. at 18. She contends that the record 
demonstrates that her "extraordinary efforts are essential to 
her son's continued health and well-being." Br. at 14. 
 
We are unpersuaded. First, we point out that a review of 
the district court's comments at the sentencing hearing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Sweeting apparently recognizes that her son's condition is pivotal to 
the analysis of whether the district court erred in granting a departure 
under section 5H1.6 given her family situation. Importantly, this factor 
is the sole basis on which she argues in her brief that she faces 
"extraordinary" family responsibilities. See br. at 12 ("It is submitted 
that 
this mother's responsibilities for the care of an adolescent child with 
Tourette's Syndrome constituted an extraordinary family responsibility. 
For this reason, the district court did not abuse its discretion [in] 
granting the downward departure."). 
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confirms that in granting the downward departure under 
section 5H1.6, the court was motivated primarily by the 
circumstance that Sweeting's incarceration would break up 
the family unit because of her status as a single parent. 
See app. at 201-02 ("[T]he circumstances of this case are 
extraordinary. We are dealing with a single parent."); id. at 
202 ("It is a breakdown in the family, a breakdown that is 
all too common. And we collectively, as a society, should do 
what we can to support the family. . . ."); id. at 203 
("[I]ncarceration would have a very serious detrimental 
effect on the family unit[;] it would break up the family 
unit, and that's a consequence that I don't want to see 
happen in this case."). Indeed, the district court only 
mentioned her son's Tourette's Syndrome once in the entire 
course of its findings on this point: "I find that the 
extraordinary circumstances in this case is that Ms. 
Sweeting is a single parent providing for five children, one 
of whom has a substantial neurological deficit in the form 
of Tourette's Syndrome." App. at 202. It did not make any 
specific factual findings regarding the severity of Sweeting's 
son's condition, or the nature of care that she provides to 
him. Thus, while on appeal Sweeting presses this particular 
family circumstance as the definitive factor justifying the 
district court's departure determination, the district court 
did not predicate its ruling to any significant degree on the 
fact that her son had Tourette's Syndrome. 
 
Second, and more importantly, while we in no way intend 
to minimize the difficulties facing a parent whose child 
suffers from Tourette's Syndrome, the record in this case 
suggests that there is nothing about the severity of this 
child's condition or the nature of the care that he requires 
indicating that Sweeting is so irreplaceable that her 
otherwise ordinary family ties and responsibilities are 
transformed into the "extraordinary" situation warranting a 
departure under section 5H1.6. First, as to the nature of 
the care that her son requires, the evidence demonstrates 
that after Sweeting's son was diagnosed with Tourette's 
Syndrome, his neurologist, Dr. Lilik, provided several 
treatment suggestions, including daily physical activity, and 
organization of the young man's personal habits, school 
work and home responsibilities. Dr. Lilik also provided 
Sweeting with a list of foods to eliminate from her son's 
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diet, and instructed that her son should avoid taking 
stimulant decongestive medications and refrain from 
watching television and video games during the school 
week. On a follow up visit, Dr. Lilik suggested that 
Sweeting's son should participate in a daily exercise 
program (in the mornings) and become involved in sports 
throughout the entire year. 
 
The record indicates (and the government does not 
dispute) that Sweeting complied with Dr. Lilik's 
suggestions. See app. at 180-81 (describing Sweeting's care 
for her son as consisting of exercising with him in the 
mornings, shopping for and preparing his meals, helping 
him with his homework, and administering his medication 
when necessary). And we agree with Sweeting that the 
record reflects the fact that her son must continue this diet 
and exercise regimen to combat and control the symptoms 
of his condition. Nevertheless, there simply is nothing 
about the type of care that he requires that suggests to us 
that it is so unique or burdensome that another responsible 
adult could not provide the necessary supervision and 
assistance in Sweeting's absence. As the government 
pointed out at oral argument, the degree of extra attention 
that her son needs as a result of his condition pales in 
comparison to that which is required by an infant who 
needs constant care and supervision. Compare Dyce, 91 
F.3d at 1467 (rejecting defendant's argument that 
downward departure was necessary so that she could care 
for and nourish her three-month old infant); Headley, 923 
F.2d at 1082 (youngest child was 11 months old). 
 
Moreover, as the record demonstrates, the regimen that 
Sweeting has followed with her son thus far has assisted 
him in controlling the effects of his condition. Sweeting's 
attorney recognized that his condition is not "so disabling 
that he can't play football, he plays football.[It is not so 
disabling that] he can't attend school, he does attend 
school." App. at 179-80. Thus, it does not appear that the 
child's Tourette's Syndrome is so severe that it precludes 
him from participating meaningfully in various school and 
social activities. 
 
These observations confirm that while her child's 
neurological condition supports Sweeting's contention that 
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he "needs to be taken care of " in a way that differs from 
the needs of her other four children, her responsibilities to 
her son do not differentiate her situation to such a degree 
so as to support the finding that her case is extraordinary. 
Our conclusion on this point is guided, as it must be, see 
Koon, 518 U.S. at 98, 116 S.Ct. at 2047, by other cases in 
which a defendant has sought a downward departure under 
section 5H1.6 under similar factual circumstances--namely 
where the defendant claimed "extraordinary" family 
responsibilities in part due to his or her obligation to care 
for a disabled family member. While we have found several 
cases that support our conclusion in this case, we need 
only highlight the most pertinent to our analysis on this 
point. 
 
For example, in Archuleta the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit reversed the district court's downward 
departure under section 5H1.6 based on the circumstance 
that the defendant was the sole support for two of his 
children and cared for his elderly, diabetic mother. See 128 
F.3d at 1447. There the defendant pleaded guilty to 
providing false statements in the acquisition of afirearm in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. S 922(a)(6), and to one count of being 
a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
S 922(g)(1). The district court departed downward 8 levels 
from the applicable Guidelines range and imposed a 
sentence of five months imprisonment, five months home 
confinement, and three years supervised release based on 
his extraordinary family ties and responsibilities. See id. at 
1447-48. 
 
The court of appeals vacated the sentence, finding that 
the family circumstances the district court relied upon to 
justify its departure were insufficient to take this case out 
of the "heartland" of cases governed by the Guidelines. See 
id. at 1452. The court first found that the district court's 
reliance on the defendant's status as sole caretaker of his 
children as a basis for the section 5H1.6 departure was 
inconsistent with the court's decision in United States v. 
Webb, 49 F.3d 636, which held that the defendant's status 
as a single parent of a son did not constitute an 
extraordinary circumstance warranting a departure. See id. 
at 1450. With respect to the district court's reliance on 
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defendant's status as the caretaker of his diabetic, elderly 
mother, the court of appeals observed that 
 
       the record is scarce on the details of the care she 
       requires. Nor does the record say anything about the 
       mother's mental and physical abilities, including her 
       ability to prepare her own meals and, perhaps, 
       partially care for the children. Assuming the mother 
       cannot administer her own medication or maintain a 
       properly balanced diet, the record is equally silent on 
       the availability of home nurse visits and other services 
       for the sick and elderly. 
 
        The record reflects the representation of Archuleta's 
       counsel that six of his eight siblings in the Espanola 
       area cannot undertake his mother's care, or that of 
       Archuleta's children. There is no evidence regarding the 
       remaining two siblings, or the availability of other 
       alternatives for care. 
 
Id. at 1450-51. 
 
Similarly in United States v. Allen, 87 F.3d 1224 (11th 
Cir. 1996), the defendant pleaded guilty to one count of 
bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 1344 after she 
admitted to diverting approximately $138,000 of her 
employer's funds into her own bank account. The relevant 
Guidelines range called for a sentence of 12-18 months for 
the crime. At sentencing, the defendant sought a departure 
for extraordinary family ties and responsibilities based on 
the fact that she was the primary caretaker of her 70-year 
old father who suffered from Alzheimer's and Parkinson's 
diseases. The district court departed 5 offense levels and 
sentenced the defendant to one hour of imprisonment, and 
36 months of supervised release. See id. at 1225. 
 
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit vacated the 
sentence and remanded the matter to the district court for 
resentencing. Citing several cases in which the courts 
denied departures because the circumstances were not 
atypical, the court stated that in its view, the defendant's 
family responsibilities "though difficult, are not 
extraordinary." See id. The court noted specifically that the 
defendant was not "the only family member available to 
care for her father. The Presentence Report indicates that 
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[the defendant's] husband and adult son take care of her 
father to some extent, and that [the defendant] has a 
brother and another adult child living nearby." Id. at 1226 
n.1. 
 
Finally, in United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754 (4th Cir. 
1996), the defendant was convicted for conspiracy and 
perjury. See id. at 756. The district court granted the 
defendant a 5-level downward departure, in part on the 
basis of his extraordinary family responsibilities. The Court 
of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit initially reversed the 
district court's 5-level departure. See United States v. 
Rybicki, 1995 WL 420001 (4th Cir. July 13, 1995). But in 
light of its decision in Koon, the Supreme Court vacated the 
court of appeals' judgment and remanded the case for 
further consideration. See Rybicki v. United States, 518 
U.S. 1014, 116 S.Ct. 2543 (1996). 
 
On remand, the court of appeals adhered to its earlier 
ruling reversing the district court's departure, but modified 
its reasoning after considering Koon. The court recognized 
that the district court based its downward departure in part 
on the fact that the defendant had a nine-year old son with 
neurological problems who was in need of special 
supervision, and a wife experiencing a period of fragile 
mental health. It nevertheless held that the record 
indicated that defendant's responsibilities to his son and 
wife were not factors present to an "exceptional degree" so 
as to warrant a departure under section 5H1.6. See id. at 
759. 
 
Here, in a situation consistent with those in Archuleta, 
Allen, and Rybicki, Sweeting's son's Tourette's Syndrome 
obviously requires that he receive additional attention and 
care. Nevertheless, there is nothing extraordinary about the 
nature or severity of his condition, his physician's 
prescribed method of treatment, or the type of assistance 
Sweeting provides, which compels the conclusion that no 
other competent adult could make sure that her son 
continues to exercise, eat and sleep properly, and take his 
medication at the appropriate times. Sweeting maintains 
throughout her brief that this regimen is an essential part 
of her son's treatment, but again there is nothing in the 
record suggesting that Sweeting (and only Sweeting) can 
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provide him with the care and attention he needs, or that 
he as a teenager cannot take some responsibility for his 
own care. This, we believe, is an important factor to 
consider in determining whether the district court's section 
5H1.6 departure was warranted. See Tocco, 200 F.3d at 
435-36 (remanding for resentencing where district court 
departed 2 levels for extraordinary family responsibilities 
where the defendant's wife had cancer and emphysema; 
court of appeals instructed that on remand, the district 
court should "make specific findings regarding [the 
defendant's] personal involvement in the care of his wife 
and other family members," and should consider whether 
his wife had "alternative sources of support," inasmuch as 
the record demonstrated that the defendant had eight 
children, seven of whom lived in the area and one of whom 
was a doctor); see also Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1467 (finding that 
district court's downward departure under section 5H1.6 on 
the basis that the defendant was breast feeding her child at 
the time of sentencing was erroneous; court reasoned in 
part that "there is no evidence in the record supporting the 
district court's statement in its Sentencing Opinion that the 
infant was `totally dependent on [Dyce] for nourishment,' 
nor is there any evidence that the child could not have been 
fed from a bottle."); United States v. Shortt , 919 F.2d 1325, 
1328 (8th Cir. 1990) (vacating district court's departure 
based on defendant's position as the sole provider for his 
family and the fact that he assisted his disabled father on 
his farm; court of appeals determined that defendant's two 
brothers could help their father on the farm, and 
defendant's position as the provider for his family did not 
make his case "extraordinary"). 
 
We also note that these decisions further demonstrate 
the point that a family member's medical problems cannot 
be viewed in a vacuum; rather, courts considering whether 
to depart must weigh carefully, among other things, the 
severity of the condition and the degree of extra attention 
that it requires. See Gaskill, 991 F.2d at 82-84. Thus, while 
we recognize that there is evidence in the record that 
supports the conclusion that Sweeting's son has 
experienced behavioral and learning difficulties associated 
with his condition, we find it relevant to our ultimate 
determination that her son is able to attend school and 
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participate in various sports activities with a large measure 
of success. These facts, which are uncontroverted by the 
parties, certainly undercut Sweeting's argument that her 
son's disorder presents her with extraordinary family 
responsibilities--at least to the extent that her argument 
rests in part on the fact that her son is a "chronically infirm 
child," see br. at 11, 18, who suffers from "a rare medical 
condition." App. at 35. As the record reflects, Sweeting's 
son attends high school, has been the captain of the 
football team, and has participated in track andfield, 
basketball, baseball and karate. App. at 34, 106-07. 
 
Finally, Sweeting's counsel represented at the sentencing 
hearing that Sweeting made arrangements with friends 
"who she could trust" to take care of her children, including 
her son, in the event that the district court rejected her 
downward departure request and sentenced her to a period 
of incarceration. App. at 178. In particular, Sweeting 
informed the district court that she had arranged for 
someone in Edgewood, Maryland, to care for her son. Id. 
This fact further confirms that in Sweeting's absence, her 
son would not be left without anyone to care for him and 
assist him in managing his symptoms, which in turn 
undercuts her apparent concern (and presumably that of 
the district court) that her son's condition would go 
unregulated in her absence. See Dyce, 91 F.3d at 1467 
(noting, as a factor militating against departure, that the 
children would be cared for by defendant's family rather 
than placed in foster care); United States v. Abbott, 975 F. 
Supp. 703, 709 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (rejecting defendant's 
downward departure motion under 5H1.6 where his mother 
and wife could care for his children, despite the fact that 
wife and mother had medical problems); cf. Leandre, 132 
F.3d at 807-08 (affirming district court's denial of departure 
under section 5H1.6 where defendant was a single father of 
two young children who might be placed in foster care if 
defendant's brother refused to care for them; "[s]uch 
evidence of a difficult family situation that will arise upon 
[defendant's] incarceration is, unfortunately, no more 
extraordinary than that deemed by the Dyce court not to be 
sufficiently extraordinary for a departure"). 
 
It thus appears from a review of the record that the fact 
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that Sweeting's son is afflicted with Tourette's Syndrome 
does not render this case distinguishable from Headley to 
a degree sufficient to warrant a departure under section 
5H1.6. Indeed, when compared to the facts in Archuleta, 
Allen, Rybicki and other courts of appeals' decisions on 
point, it is clear to us that the existence of his condition 
does not present a situation in which incarceration would 
cause Sweeting or her son to suffer an atypical hardship 
sufficient to take this case out of the heartland of cases in 
which a parent has committed a crime requiring 
incarceration.5 At bottom, the unfortunate fact is that her 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We recognize, as Sweeting points out in her brief, that there are 
decisions by other courts of appeals that have upheld downward 
departures under section 5H1.6 where the circumstances demonstrated 
that the defendant was responsible for the care of a sick family member. 
She contends that those cases support her position because the 
defendants were responsible for the care of dependents, at least one of 
whom was disabled. We reject this argument, however, as we do not 
agree with Sweeting's assessment that the cases she cites are analogous 
to the factual situation presented here. Indeed, a review of the cases 
that 
she relies upon confirms that each had an additional factual component 
distinguishing it from this case. See, e.g., United States v. Haversat, 22 
F.3d 790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994) (upholding district court's finding that 
section 5H1.6 departure was warranted based on totality of 
circumstances which indicated that defendant's wife had suffered "severe 
psychological problems which [had] been potentially life threatening," 
defendant was involved actively in her care and wife's treating physician 
characterized his participation as an "irreplaceable part" of his wife's 
treatment plan, doctor's testimony confirmed that he (the doctor) 
depended on the defendant to identify the beginning of his wife's 
regression, and doctor stated on the record that he would have "grave 
clinical concerns that her medical management could be safely 
continued without the ongoing presence of her spouse"; court of appeals, 
however, remanded for resentencing because the extent of the departure 
was unreasonable); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 970, 972 (1st Cir. 
1993) (upholding district court's departure under section 5H1.6 where 
the defendant had developed a special and crucially important 
relationship with girlfriend's 12-year old son, who suffered from 
Attention Deficit Disorder and had been physically abused by his 
biological father; child underwent weekly individual psychotherapy and 
his psychologist submitted letters to the court concluding that the 
defendant "played a major positive role in [the child's] therapy" and that 
his continued presence was "necessary for [the child's] increasing 
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children will suffer the same type and degree of injury felt 
by any family where a parent is incarcerated. Cf. United 
States v. Maddox, 48 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1995) 
(remanding for resentencing for further development of the 
record on the nature of defendant's family responsibilities, 
but opining that evidence that defendant "relates well" to 
his severely mentally retarded sister, provides"invaluable 
care for her and his mother," and is "crucial to the 
structure and stability of his family" was insufficient to 
show that defendant's family ties were extraordinary); 
United States v. Goff, 20 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 1994) (pre- 
Koon decision applying de novo standard of review and 
determining that district court erred in awarding section 
5H1.6 departure where defendant supported three young 
sons and his wife had begun receiving Social Security 
disability benefits for a depression disorder and anxiety 
attacks; court stated that defendant's family responsibilities 
were "not outside the heartland of cases that the 
Sentencing Commission has considered"). 
 
Sweeting contends nevertheless that her son's school 
principal, Karen DeSantis, testified at the sentencing 
hearing that Sweeting's continued parental efforts are 
essential to her son's continued health and well-being 
because his life is "on a tightrope." She argues that the 
record confirms that she is an essential part of her son's 
life because it is her extraordinary efforts that are keeping 
him from falling "off that tightrope." Br. at 14. 
 
To be sure, Ms. DeSantis stressed that Sweeting's son 
needed a great deal of guidance and one-on-one contact, 
and opined that his life "is on a tightrope." App. at 217, 
220. But as the government correctly states, her testimony 
on this point must be read in context. The fact that 
Sweeting's son needs one-on-one guidance does not lead to 
the conclusion that Sweeting is the only person capable of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
progress"; and that the defendant "continues to be the only available 
resource for positive bonding"); United States v. Alba, 933 F.2d 1117, 
1122 (2d Cir. 1991) (upholding departure where record showed that the 
defendant had a wife and two daughters, aged four and 11, lived with his 
grandmother and disabled father who depended on the defendant to 
assist him moving in and out of a wheelchair). 
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providing it. Compare United States v. Haversat , 22 F.3d 
790, 797 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sclamo, 997 F.2d 
970, 972 (1st Cir. 1993). Moreover, to the extent that her 
testimony supports the conclusion that Sweeting is a 
positive influence on her son's life, as we have indicated 
above, that circumstance is not the atypical or 
extraordinary situation warranting a departure. 
 
More importantly, it is clear to us from a reading of her 
entire testimony on this point that her reference to 
Sweeting's son's life being on a "tightrope" is based not 
primarily on the fact that his Tourette's Syndrome has 
affected his learning abilities and behavior, but on the 
circumstance that he is a "Black male in Scranton" that 
may succumb to peer pressure more readily.6 App. at 220. 
Again, while certainly unfortunate, there is nothing 
extraordinary about the effect of peer pressure on high 
school children that takes this case out of the"heartland" 
of cases sentenced under the Guidelines where the 
defendants have family responsibilities to their adolescent 
children. Indeed, we do not quarrel with the proposition 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The following exchange between Sweeting's counsel and Ms. DeSantis 
provides further context for the principal's statement that we quote in 
the text: 
 
       Q. Can you describe some of the peer pressures tha t may exist for 
       a young Black male in the City of Scranton in 1999? 
 
       A. Well, I think more--and you mentioned the you ng Black male, 
       and I think that half of it has to be considered. Too many of the 
       Black students will say to me, you know, Ms. DeSantis, I have so 
       much pressure against me to achieve. So many of my friends will 
       call me names if I try and achieve. And I can see[defendant's son] 
       in a more open environment, a larger school if he goes to Scranton 
       High School, more students, more freedom, I can see him bending 
       to that pressure. He needs strong parental guidance, more than [her 
       second child]. 
 
        I could see a tremendous problem with him if he doesn't have a 
       firm hand on him. He needs someone that's going to be in the 
       school the first type of slight problem, that's going to work with 
the 
       school and work with him. He is going to need that right from the 
       beginning. 
 
App. at 218-19. 
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that a parent is an important influence on a child's growth 
and maturation into adulthood. But the fact that Sweeting 
provided such guidance to her son does not differentiate 
the situation here from other cases in which children whose 
parents are incarcerated similarly lose that support system.7 
 
Sweeting also maintains that her family situation is 
similar to that involved in United States v. Gaskill, where 
we held that the defendant's responsibility of providing the 
only source of care to his mentally ill wife presented an 
"extraordinary" family responsibility that took his case out 
of the heartland of cases governed by the Guidelines. See 
991 F.2d 82. Sweeting's protestations notwithstanding, our 
review of the factual circumstances presented in Gaskill 
confirms that the result in that case actually supports our 
finding that the departure awarded here was a clear abuse 
of discretion. 
 
In Gaskill, a former president of a computer company 
pleaded guilty to fraudulent use of social security numbers 
to obtain things of value. See 991 F.2d at 83. At 
sentencing, he sought a downward departure based on his 
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities to his wife. 
The record demonstrated that Gaskill resigned from his 
well-paid position at a computer company, at least partially 
because of his wife's erratic conduct caused by an onset of 
mental illness. Gaskill's wife, a college graduate who in her 
earlier years had careers as an interior decorator, teacher, 
and businesswoman, suffered her first serious mental 
illness following the birth of their fourth child. Over the 
years, she experienced bouts of depression accompanied by 
suicide attempts and was hospitalized in a number of 
institutions, having displayed erratic and compulsive 




7. At oral argument, Sweeting's attorney pointed to the fact that 
Sweeting's son had been teased by his peers because of the effects of his 
condition on his behavior. He argued that the other children's 
inappropriate actions supported his argument that Sweeting's son needs 
his mother's influence in his life. But we cannot ascribe significance to 
the fact that her son is being ridiculed by his adolescent peers, as 
unfortunately that circumstance is not atypical. 
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At sentencing, Gaskill introduced letters and testimony 
concerning the nature and severity of his wife's condition, 
and his role in caring for her. He submitted a letter from 
his wife's attending psychiatrist which indicated that she 
had experienced intellectual deterioration evidenced by a 
marked decrease in vocabulary and reduced verbal 
communication. The record also demonstrated that his wife 
watched television for 15 or 20 minutes a day, and stayed 
in bed resting for the remainder of the day. Moreover, 
Gaskill's wife had no personal friends and had no contact 
with extended family members. Gaskill testified at the 
sentencing hearing about the deleterious effect that his 
wife's illness had on her relationship with her children, 
explaining that they thought their mother was vindictive 
and cruel, and did not understand that her behavior was 
related to her mental illness. See id. at 83-84. 
 
In addition to the testimony concerning the severe nature 
of his wife's mental illness, the evidence overwhelmingly 
demonstrated Gaskill's indispensable role in maintaining 
his wife's well being. Indeed, the record showed that Gaskill 
performed almost all household chores and was responsible 
for administering proper medication for his wife. Moreover, 
her psychiatrist opined that Gaskill's wife was totally 
dependent on him, and that her medication was an 
essential aspect of her treatment. See id. at 84. 
 
The district court denied Gaskill's departure request, 
stating that it lacked authority to depart under section 
5H1.6. Consistent with the applicable Guidelines range, the 
district court imposed a four-month period of incarceration, 
followed by four months in a halfway house or a 
community treatment center, and a period of supervised 
release. See id. at 83. On appeal, we vacated Gaskill's 
sentence and remanded the matter to the district court for 
resentencing. We explained that section 5H1.6 does not 
prohibit departures, but restricts them to cases where the 
circumstances are extraordinary. We found that the 
situation presented by Gaskill's family responsibilities to 
his wife stood in "sharp contrast" to the cases in which 
departure was found to be unwarranted. See id.  at 85-86. 
First, there was no real dispute that his wife's mental 
condition was serious. Moreover, we pointed out that the 
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wife's current living status demonstrated the defendant's 
pivotal role in her care. At oral argument, Gaskill's attorney 
represented that since his incarceration, his wife had been 
living alone, subsisting on food that her daughter left once 
a week, did not leave the house, and had not seen her 
doctor. See id. at 84 n.1. 
 
In addition to the fact that the record demonstrated that 
Gaskill's wife suffered from serious effects of her mental 
illness and depended totally on her husband for care, we 
also explained that "the length of imprisonment mandated 
by the Guidelines and the nature of the offense are also 
circumstances that should be factored into the equation" in 
determining whether a departure is warranted. See id. at 
85. In particular, we contrasted the circumstances in 
Gaskill to the facts in Headley where the lower end of 
Guidelines range for the defendant's drug conviction 
required a sentence of 17 years imprisonment, and noted 
that given the substantial sentence required, the children 
were destined to be consigned to foster care even if the 
sentence were reduced substantially. We further 
distinguished Headley because that case presented "some 
question whether the best interests of the children would 
be served by allowing them to remain under the care of the 
defendant who had exposed them to the atmosphere of 
large scale drug dealings." Id. We summarized our holding 
in Gaskill as follows: 
 
       [t]he record demonstrates circumstances quite out of 
       the ordinary. The degree of care required for the 
       defendant's wife, the lack of close supervision by any 
       family member other than the defendant, the risk to 
       the wife's well being, the relatively brief--in one sense 
       --imprisonment sentence called for by the Guidelines 
       computation, the lack of any end to be served by 
       imprisonment other than punishment, the lack of any 
       threat to the community--indeed, the benefit to it by 
       allowing the defendant to care for his ailing wife--are 
       all factors that warrant departure. 
 
Id. at 86. 
 
We find the circumstances in this case clearly 
distinguishable from the situation we faced in Gaskill for a 
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number of reasons. First, as previously mentioned, there 
was no indication in Gaskill that the defendant had a 
violent nature, nor was his offense classified as a violent 
crime. Here, as in Headley, Sweeting was convicted of a 
violation of the Controlled Substances Act, which Congress 
considers a serious crime that endangers the community as 
a whole. Moreover, unlike the defendant in Gaskill, where 
we found that there was "no indication that the defendant 
has a violent nature," id. at 85, the PSI confirms that 
Sweeting engaged in violent behavior in the past in 
connection with some of her prior crimes. Furthermore, it 
is clear that unlike the defendant in Gaskill , Sweeting had 
been engaged in a criminal business, i.e., the sale of 
narcotics. Thus, we believe that this case presents a 
situation in which "there would be some question whether 
the best interests of the children would be served by 
allowing them to remain under the care of the defendant," 
see id., who admitted to engaging in drug sales to enable 
her to purchase items of value for herself and her children. 
See Abbott, 975 F. Supp. at 710 (distinguishing Gaskill 
because defendant had "a history of crimes involving actual 
violence, the threat of violence, and the use of weapons").8 
 
Second, the severity of Gaskill's wife's mental illness, the 
degree of care required in response to it, and the lack of 
available alternative sources of care further distinguish this 
case from Gaskill. It is fair to say that the record in Gaskill 
demonstrated to us that Gaskill's wife had limited (if any) 
ability to function normally, and that her husband was 
essential to sustaining her well being because the effects of 
her illness alienated her remaining family and friends. The 
degree of care that Sweeting's son requires as a result of 
his disorder pales in comparison; the record shows that 
Sweeting exercises with him in the morning, monitors his 
diet by restricting the type of foods he eats, makes sure 
that he takes his medication and gets sufficient sleep, and 
sees the doctor once a year. But as we previously found, 
there is nothing in the record indicating that another 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. The PSI further stated that after Sweeting's arrest, government agents 
executed a search warrant at her residence in Scranton, finding, inter 
alia, a Ruger .45 caliber semi-automatic pistol and two loaded 
magazines. PSI P 13. 
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responsible adult could not (and would not) perform these 
obligations in Sweeting's absence. Sweeting made 
arrangements for her son to live with a friend in Maryland 
that she trusted, and it would be mere speculation on our 
part if we were to find that the person she chose would be 
unable or unwilling to monitor her son's care as necessary. 
Moreover, unlike the situation presented in Gaskill, it 
cannot be said that her son's condition requires constant, 
around-the-clock attention, and there is no statement from 
Dr. Lilik indicating that his continued health depends 
totally on her presence in the home. Compare Gaskill, 991 
F.2d at 84. 
 
Finally, we point out that Sweeting's sentence under the 
Guidelines is significant, even after we account for the 
other departures the district court granted and which the 
government does not challenge on this appeal. Sweeting 
was subject to a sentence in the Guidelines range of 41-51 
months, which is a substantially longer period of time than 
the eight-month sentence mandated by the applicable 
Guidelines range in Gaskill. In Gaskill , the relatively light 
Guidelines sentence was a factor that militated in favor of 
granting a departure under section 5H1.6, inasmuch as 
only a slight departure would yield the necessary result of 
keeping the family intact. See id. at 85-86. Here, however, 
the district court granted Sweeting a 12-level departure in 
order to achieve the same result, which, as we have 
indicated, she did not deserve in the first place. 
 
Finally, in view of the record presented, we see no merit 
in the argument that a finding of an abuse of discretion in 
this case ignores the district court's "special competence" in 
assessing the "ordinariness or unusualness" of a particular 
case. See Koon, 518 U.S. at 99, 116 S.Ct. at 2047. To the 
contrary, we recognize the indispensable role of the district 
court in making the fact-intensive determination that is 
critical to the analysis required by section 5H1.6 and our 
case law applying that provision. We nevertheless agree 
with the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's 
observation that appellate courts "must ensure that the 
circumstances relied upon to justify the downward 
departure are [not] so far removed from those found 
exceptional in existing case law that the sentencing court 
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may be said to be acting outside permissible limits." See 
Faria, 161 F.3d at 762 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(alteration in original); see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 98, 116 
S.Ct. at 2047 (explaining that the determination of whether 
a given factor is present to an exceptional degree must be 
made by comparing the facts of other Guidelines cases). 
Thus, while we must approach the issue by according the 
district court's determination "substantial deference" in 
accordance with the Supreme Court's decision in Koon, see 
Iannone, 184 F.3d at 227, we do not read Koon as 
constraining our role to the point that it would require us 
to uphold a district court's departure determination that is, 
in our opinion, a clear abuse of discretion. Here, based on 
the record presented, we conclude that the district court 
acted outside the boundaries of its discretion infinding 
extraordinary family ties and responsibilities warranting a 




For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Deneen 
Sweeting's family ties and responsibilities are not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The government argues in the alternative that if we affirm the district 
court's initial decision to depart under 5H1.6, the court nonetheless 
acted unreasonably in granting the degree of departure that it did. Given 
our resolution of this appeal, it is not necessary for us to address in 
detail the government's argument on that second point. Nevertheless, we 
note that, while not critical to our analysis, we agree that the district 
court abused its discretion in awarding the degree of departure that it 
did. Unlike the situation in Gaskill where we found that there was a 
"lack of any end to be served by imprisonment other than punishment," 
see 991 F.2d at 86, imprisonment in this case would serve the important 
purposes underlying the Guidelines themselves--deterrence, 
incapacitation, just punishment and rehabilitation. See 1998 U.S.S.G. 
ch. 1, Pt. A, intro. As the PSI in this case reflects, Sweeting is a 
recidivist 
who came before the sentencing court with a Criminal History Category 
VI despite her relatively young age (age 31 on the date of her arrest). We 
think it is fair to say that some period of incarceration is necessary in 
this case to punish Sweeting for her most recent and very serious 
criminal conduct. Thus, we believe that the district court's sentence of 
five years probation with 12 months of home confinement wholly 
disregarded the extent of Sweeting's prior criminal history and the 
serious nature of her most recent illegal conduct. 
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"extraordinary" in the sense contemplated by section 5H1.6, 
and that she was not entitled to any downward departure 
on that basis. Accordingly, we will vacate the judgment of 
conviction and sentence entered in the district court on 
August 26, 1999, and will remand for resentencing 
consistent with this opinion. 
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